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INTRODUCTION
In 1985, an assistant professor of Medieval Literature at the
University of Illinois at Chicago, Antonio Mastrobuono, and his
wife, Diana Mastrobuono, entrusted all of their savings to Nick
DiMinico, a vice-president and representative of Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc. (Shearson).1 DiMinico was hired to manage their
money in a brokerage account.2 After just two years, DiMinico
squandered a substantial part of the Mastrobuonos' investment.3
In 1989, the Mastrobuonos charged that Shearson and DiMinico
"subjected [their account] to unauthorized trading, churning,4 and
margin exposure."5 Pursuant to the customer agreement between
t" A.B. 1992, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Pennsylvania.
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1 See Petitioner's Brief at 3-5, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (No. 94-18) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
2 In a typical brokerage account, an investor will purchase securities through a
broker, often requesting advice from the broker about which securities to buy and
which to sell. Occasionally, the investor will authorize the broker to trade securities
on her behalf without her prior consent to each trade.
s See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 6.
Churning is a type of broker fraud whereby the broker "carries out a series of
purchases and resales [on the customer's behalf] that are excessive in both size and
frequency, thus inflating the brokerage commission." Michael S. Wilson, Punitive
Damages in the Arbitration of Securities Churning Cases, 11 REV. LITIG. 137, 139 (1991).
Brokers typically charge a commission each time they execute a trade in a customer's
account.
' Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (footnote added), affid, 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), and rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212
(1995).
(197)
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Shearson and the Mastrobuonos, an arbitration panel of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) heard the
complaint against Shearson and ultimately awarded the Mastro-
buonos $159,327 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in
punitive damages.
6
In vacating the punitive damage award, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that,
according to the terms of the agreement, the arbitrators did not
have the authority to award it.7  The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,' effectively stripping the
Mastrobuonos of close to seventy-five percent of their award. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that, by including a clause providing that
New York law would govern the agreement, the parties manifested
their intent to subject the authority of the arbitrators to any
constraints placed on them by New York law-and New York law,
as established in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., prohibits arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages.'
0
Undoubtedly, Shearson was elated by the Seventh Circuit's
ruling, as brokerage firms would like to exclude punitive damages
from arbitration altogether. In holding that a New York choice-of-
law clause foreclosed the arbitrators' ability to award punitive
damages, the Seventh Circuit made it simple for brokerage firms to
avoid the possibility of such sanctions. Even before the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Mastrobuono, many firms included a New York
choice-of-law clause in their pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
They relied on the decision in Garrity and the position of courts like
the Seventh Circuit to exclude, in effect, punitive damages as a
remedy.12
The Mastrobuonos successfully challenged this tactic, however,
before the United States Supreme Court."3 They argued, and the
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
9 See 20 F.3d at 717.
" See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that
an author could not collect punitive damages from her publisher because they were
awarded by an arbitrator); see also infra part III.C for a more complete analysis of
Garrity.
" See C. Evan Stewart, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, N.Y. L.J.,July 21, 1994, at
1,4.
12 See id.
" Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
1995] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 199
Court agreed, that the New York choice-of-law clause does not dic-
tate the arbitrators' ability to award punitive damages. 14 In a nar-
rowly tailored decision, the Court held that it was not clear from the
wording of the customer agreement between the Mastrobuonos and
Shearson 5 whether New York decisional law, and thus Garrity, was
intended to govern the authority of the arbitrators to grant remed-
ies.16 The Court relied almost exclusively on the ambiguity of the
actual agreement to reach its decision and did not speak to broader
issues such as the potential inequity of limiting the remedies avail-
able to customers or, on the other hand, the problems with allowing
arbitrators to award punitive damages. 7 As a result, the fundamen-
tal question whether arbitrators should be permitted to award puni-
tive damages in securities cases remains open. Now the agencies
that regulate the securities industry must answer this question.
The regulatory agencies, primarily the NASD and the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) have the authority to promulgate rules
governing the arbitration process, including the types of awards that
can be granted." These agencies will seek to compel punitive
damages in arbitration only if they believe punitive damages serve
H4 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 42-43 (citingBonarv. Dean WitterReynolds,
Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988), which held that a choice-of-law clause only
dictates the substantive law that arbitrators must apply).
15 The agreement stated, in relevant part:
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of your [Shearson's] successors
and assigns[,] shall be binding on the undersigned, my [petitioners'] heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, and shall be governed by the laws of
the State of New York. Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law,
any controversy arising out of or relating to [my] accounts, to transactions
with you, your officers, directors, agents and/or employees for me or to this
agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules then in effect, of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
If I do not make such election by registered mail addressed to you at your
main office within 5 days after demand by you that I make such election,
then you may make such election. Judgment upon any award rendered by
the arbitrators may be entered in any court havingjurisdiction thereof. This
agreement to arbitrate does not apply to future disputes arising under
certain of the federal securities laws to the extent it has been determined as
a matter of law that I cannot be compelled to arbitrate such claims.
Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216 n.2 (alterations in original).
16 See id. at 1217.
17 See id. at 1216-18.
" See Interview with Deborah Masucci, Vice-President and Director ofArbitration,
National Association of Securities Dealers, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 3, 1995)
[hereinafter Masucci Interview].
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an important function in the securities industry. In forming their
opinion, the agencies must consider the functions punitive damages
are designed to serve and whether they successfully serve those
functions in securities arbitration. In addition, the constitutional
requirements of due process may mean that punitive damages can
only be awarded under certain circumstances. 19  If punitive
damages are to become a fixture in securities arbitration, the
agencies must address the due process requirements.
This Comment argues that punitive damages are a necessary
component of arbitration in the securities industry, but that, given
the requirements of due process, arbitrators should be constrained
in their ability to make such awards. To develop this argument, the
Comment is divided into four parts. Part I chronicles the evolution
of arbitration in the securities industry and summarizes the legal
debate that developed in the courts regarding whether to uphold or
vacate punitive damage awards by arbitrators. Part II analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono and concludes that the
ultimate question whether punitive damage awards should be
available in securities arbitration has been left to the industry
regulators. Part III explores the purposes of punitive damages and
argues that they are vital to the legitimacy of arbitration as the
primary method of dispute resolution in broker-customer cases and
that they aid in policing the conduct of brokerage firms. In
addition, Part III discusses the public policy concerns and the
constitutional limitations on arbitrators' authority to award punitive
damages. Finally, Part IV advocates a change in the current
procedure for awarding punitive damages in securities arbitration
which meets the constitutional requirements of due process while
enabling punitive damages to serve important functions.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE OVER THE ROLE OF
PUNrrIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
A. The Increasing Use of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Today, disputes between brokerage firms and their customers
are typically resolved through arbitration. Brokerage firms have
increasingly compelled their customers to sign arbitration agree-
ments as a precondition to opening an account.20  The move
19 For a discussion of the due process requirements involved in arbitral awards of
punitive damages, see infra notes 216-38 and accompanying text.
" See Constantine N. Katsoris, Should McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
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toward mandatory arbitration agreements began in 1987 on the
heels of the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon.21 In McMahon, the Court declared that it is the
policy of the federal courts to "'rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate.'" 22 The decision in McMahon signaled that brokerage
firms could require customers to agree to settle their disputes in
arbitration. This legal development led to a dramatic rise in the
number of securities arbitration cases. In 1980, 830 securities
arbitration cases were filed with the self-regulatory organizations
(SROs), 23 and that number rose to 5300 cases in 1993.24 The
overwhelming number of cases are brought by investors against
brokerage firms.2 5
1113, 1131-32 (1993). Uponjoining a brokerage firm, employees must also agree to
resolve disputes through arbitration; however, this Comment addresses only those
issues raised by broker-customer agreements.
21 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see also Anthony M. Sabino, Awarding Punitive Damages in
Securities Industry Arbitration: Working for a Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 33, 34
(1992) ("[The FAA] was intended to 'revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements .... '" (quotingMcMahon, 482 U.S. at 225 (second alteration
in original))); George H. Friedman, Changes in Rules on Securities Cases, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
5, 1993, at 3, 28 (citing McMahon as the starting point of arbitration's popularity
increase).
I McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 221 (1985)).23 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURIrrIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS
FARE 18 (1992) [hereinafter GAO]. SROs are the internal organizations in the
securities industry that are responsible for overseeing the conduct of the brokerage
firms. Conducting arbitration proceedings is among their duties. The SROs include
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and
the National Association of Securities Dealers. The NASD hears the bulk of the
broker-investor arbitration cases. See J. Stratton Shartel, Attorneys Describe Diverse
Strategies in Securities Arbitration, INSIDE LITIG., May 1994, at 1, 1. In 1980, for
example, 318 of the 840 arbitration claims filed were handled by the NASD. See id.
In 1993, the NASD handled over 5000 arbitration cases. See id.
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is an independent arbitration body
which also hears securities cases. However, most firms do not offer their customers
with margin or options accounts the opportunity to bring their disputes to AAA
forums. See GAO, supra, at 32. The firms may limit the use of AAA arbitration
forums because they are generally more expensive than SRO forums and the firms
do not consider the AAA arbitrators to be as knowledgeable as SRO arbitrators about
issues unique to the securities industry. See Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
24 See Susan Antilla, An Arbitration Plan Goes Begging, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 9, 1994, at
15.
2 See Shartel, supra note 23, at 1. For example, of the 1604 securities cases
arbitrated in 1993, 1329 were "customer cases," meaning that a customer filed a
complaint against a brokerage firm. See id.
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B. The Benefits of Arbitration in Securities Cases
Brokerage firms and their customers benefit when certain
disputes are resolved in arbitration rather than in court for several
reasons. 6  First, in theory, arbitration is faster than litigation.
27
The average securities arbitration case heard in an SRO forum lasts
383 days from the time the investor's claim is filed until the
arbitrators notify the parties of their decision.21 Second, costs in
arbitration are relatively low because forum filing fees are reason-
able and investors are not required to be represented by counsel.29
Third, arbitrators' rulings are rarely overturned, thus rendering the
arbitrators "final" decisionmakers. While their decisions may be
appealed to a trial court, they are only overturned if "the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.""0 This is a difficult standard to meet
because there is typically no written opinion in a securities arbitra-
tion case.31 The narrow scope of judicial review coupled with the
2'6 Not all brokerage customers must sign arbitration agreements. Customers who
open cash accounts (where the investor purchases securities without an extension of
credit and receives cash for securities sold) normally do not have to agree to settle
disputes with the firm through arbitration. In fact, only one out of nine of the largest
brokerage firms required an arbitration agreement for cash accounts; however, 46%
of medium size firms and 37% of small firms did require arbitration agreements for
cash account customers in 1990. See GAO, supra note 23, at 28. In contrast, all of
the large firms, 90% of the medium firms, and 70% of the small firms required
arbitration agreements for margin accounts (where the broker-dealer may extend
credit to the investor for up to 50% of the purchase price of the securities) and
options accounts (where the investor may purchase the right to buy or sell securities
on a specific date). See id. Disputes relating to options and margin accounts usually
involve more technical and complex issues and subject the firm to more substantial
risk than those involving cash accounts. Arbitration is favored for these types of
accounts because the arbitrator is often familiar with the issues and because "margin
and options accounts are more likely to result in litigation ... [making] ...
arbitration, as the less costly forum .... particularly appropriate for these types of
accounts." Id. at 33 (quoting testimony of David Ruder, SEC Chairman, before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, July 12, 1988).
27 However, the GAO study stated that it is not practical to compare the time or
cost savings of broker-customer arbitration with litigation of these disputes because
very few cases are actually litigated. See GAO, supra note 23, at 35. Furthermore,
those that are scheduled to be litigated are often settled, and very little information
is available about the terms of the settlement. See id.28 See id. at 44.
' The forum filing fees in an SRO arbitration of a $40,000 claim are $520 for the
first session; for a claim of $5000 or less the fee is $125. See id. at 47. More
importantly, 42% of the investors in SRO arbitrations in 1990 were not represented
by counsel, significantly trimming the overall cost of arbitration. See id. at 40.
" Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994) (establishing the standard for
judicial review of arbitration awards).
" See C. Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79
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difficulty of demonstrating that an arbitrator has overstepped his
bounds operate to make arbitrators' decisions final. The practical
finality of arbitrators' decisions reduces the incentive of the losing
party to appeal, thereby benefitting both parties by avoiding costly
additional litigation. Fourth, many of the arbitrators who hear
securities cases have expertise in, or at least familiarity with, the
disputed issues.3 2 Armed with a more complete understanding of
the case, they can render a more informed judgment, which is
particularly beneficial in complex cases.
Brokerage firms gain an additional benefit from arbitration
because these proceedings often receive less publicity than trials.
As previously noted, no opinions are written or published, although
the results of most arbitration hearings are publicly available.
Minimizing publicity is particularly important for brokerage firms
because they stand to lose business if their reputations are tarnished
in the eyes of the public.
3 3
C. How Arbitrators' Punitive Damage Awards
Become the Subject of Litigation
Arbitration cases most often begin when an investor charges a
brokerage firm with some form of misconduct. The three most
frequent allegations in securities claims are misrepresentation of the
KY. L.J. 347,363 (1990-91) (noting that it is difficult to apply the "manifest disregard
of the law" standard of review without a written opinion). However, there is almost
always a record of the proceedings. The New York Stock Exchange, for example,
mandates that a "verbatim record of all arbitration hearings ... be kept by
stenographic reporter or tape recording." See New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
Arbitration Rules Rule 623, in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2623 (1995). At the discretion
of the parties the recording may be done with a simple tape recorder, or the parties
may hire a stenographer to create a written transcript of the proceedings. In cases
where high dollar amounts are at stake, the parties will typically invoke more
sophisticated means of recording. A written transcript is more valuable to the parties
if thejudgment of the arbitrators is appealed because the appellate body will be able
to evaluate the evidence presented in the arbitration proceeding more easily. See
Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
s2 In SRO arbitrations, the Uniform Code ofArbitration Procedures dictates that,
in a customer dispute involving more than $10,000 ($30,000 in NASD arbitrations),
two of the three arbitrators be "public arbitrators," meaning that they have no
connection to the industry. See GAO, supra note 23, at 55. However, the third
arbitrator is often an "industry arbitrator," meaning one who has some background
or involvement with the industry. See Masucci Interview, supra note 18. In cases
involving less than $10,000 ($30,000 in NASD arbitrations), one public arbitrator is
generally required. See GAO, supra note 23, at 40. See infra note 190 for a more
complete definition of "industry arbitrator."
SS See Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
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risk of an investment by the broker, negligence in managing an
investor's portfolio, and unauthorized trading in the investor's
account.3 4 Very often, customers will assert one of these charges
against the individual broker and additionally charge the broker's
firm with breach of fiduciary duty or negligence for failing to
properly supervise the activities of its employees.3 5 In all but
approximately two percent of the cases actually arbitrated, the
arbitration panel grants only compensatory damages.3 6 However,
in cases of particularly egregious misconduct, arbitrators also award
punitive damages against the firm.
3 7
Prior to Mastrobuono, punitive damage awards often became the
subject of litigation, particularly if the customer agreement specified
that New York law governed. As previously noted, arbitrators
cannot award punitive damages under New York law.3 8 Therefore,
brokerage firms resisted paying punitive damage awards imposed by
arbitrators where the customer agreement contained a New York
choice-of-law clause. The firms believed that in these cases the
arbitrators had no authority under the terms of the agreement to
make such awards. Their resistance resulted in litigation in one of
two ways: (1) if the arbitrators had already awarded the investor
s See GAO, supra note 23, at 43.
35 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 715 (7th
Cir. 1994) (stating that the broker was charged with unauthorized trading, churning,
and margin exposure and that a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence was also
asserted against Shearson), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Bonar v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1380 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding a punitive damage
award against Dean Witter after the investors alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, and gross negligence in the handling of their account);J. Alexander Sec., Inc.
v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 828, 832 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding an arbitration
panel's punitive damage award againstJ. Alexander Securities for account churning
and fraud by the broker and breach of obligation to supervise its employees), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994).
'See Punitive Award Survey, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, May 1993, at 1, 7
(reporting that punitive damages were awarded in 147 of 6870 cases arbitrated
between May 1989 and June 1992) [hereinafter Punitive Award Survey].
" It seems probable that the fear of a punitive damage award causes firms to
settle many customer disputes instead of arbitrating them. See Masucci Interview,
supra note 18. In two of the three cases cited earlier, see supra note 35, the
arbitration panel assessed the punitive damage award against the brokerage firm,
rather than against the individual broker. This result may indicate that arbitrators
wish to provide firms with an incentive to supervise their brokers more closely in the
future, in addition to merely punishing them. It is also possible that the punitive
damage awards were assessed against the brokerage firms because of their ability to
pay. See infra part III.A.2-3 for further discussion of the motivations for assessing
punitive damage awards against brokerage firms.
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
1995] PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION 205
punitive damages and the brokerage firm had refused to pay, the
investor sought enforcement of the arbitrators'judgment in court 9
or (2) the brokerage firm appealed the arbitrators' award directly
pursuant to § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),4"
claiming that the arbitrators exceeded their powers and that,
therefore, the punitive damage award should be vacated.
41
The lower courts had taken different positions on the effect of
a New York choice-of-law clause on the authority of arbitrators to
grant remedies. The Mastrobuono case provided the Supreme Court
the opportunity to settle this debate and, additionally, to announce
its views on the legality and desirability of awarding punitive
damages in arbitration. It did not. Instead, the Court crafted an
opinion that addressed only the specific customer agreement before
it, leaving both the legal issues raised by the lower courts and the
public policy concerns discussed by commentators unresolved.42
D. The Historical Debate over How to Interpret the
Intent of the Parties Regarding the Authority
of Arbitrators to Award Punitive Damages
As previously noted, the cases in which parties have sought to
enforce or vacate arbitrators' punitive damage awards, arising out
of arbitration agreements containing New York choice-of-law
clauses, had been decided inconsistently by the courts. Two lines
of thought had emerged among the federal appellate courts: courts
following the "propunitive" position upheld arbitrators' punitive
damage awards43 while those following the "antipunitive" position
consistently vacated punitive damage awards made by arbitrators."
9 See, e.g., Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir.
1991) (noting that the district court had confirmed the arbitrators' award of punitive
damages at the request of the investors).
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
4 See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir.
1988) (noting that Dean Witter first petitioned the district court to vacate the punitive
damage award).
42 See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text for a detailed analysis of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Mastrobuono.
" The propunitive position was supported primarily by the First, Eighth, Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 888 (8th Cir.) (upholding
arbitrators' punitive damage award), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991) (same);
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989) (same);
Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (l1th Cir. 1988) (same).
"" The antipunitive position was supported primarily by the Second and Seventh
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Both positions interpreted the arbitration agreements as if they
were standard contracts. This contractual analysis focused the
court's inquiry on the intent of the parties to the agreement. The
United States Supreme Court unmistakably endorsed this contractu-
al approach in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees,45 stating
that "the FAA's primary purpose... [is to] ensur[e] that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms."46
The Volt Court explicitly emphasized the supremacy of the parties'
intent, maintaining that, although the FAA endorses arbitration, it
"does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to
do SO."
47
The conflict between the circuits arose when the courts
attempted to determine, under this contractual analysis, whether the
parties did in fact intend to allow the arbitrators to award punitive
damages. Predictably, the broker-dealers insisted that the arbitra-
tion agreements did not contemplate punitive awards, while
customers maintained that they did. The central point of debate
was whether the parties intended the New York choice-of-law clause
to govern the arbitrators' ability to fashion remedies. If the parties
intended the clause to govern remedies, then arbitrators could not
make punitive damage awards because New York law prohibits
them.48 If not, the courts had to look to other indicators in the
agreement to determine the parties' intentions regarding the scope
of the arbitrators' authority.
Circuits. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 719
(7th Cir. 1994) (vacating arbitrators' punitive damage award), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212
(1995); Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)
(same).
* 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
' Id. at 479. Volt and Leland Stanford Junior University entered into a
construction contract that provided that the contract would be governed by the law
of"the place where the Project [wa]s located" (California). See id. at 470. During the
performance of the contract, a dispute arose regarding compensation for additional
work that needed to be performed. Stanford brought suit for breach of contract in
a California Superior Court. Volt responded by petitioning the court to compel
arbitration. See id. at 470-71. The question facing the Supreme Court was whether
the choice-of-law clause in the contract meant that California's state arbitration rules
governed. Under California law, arbitration can be stayed pending the resolution of
a related litigation. See id. at 470. The Court stated that because the parties agreed
to be bound by California law, as evidenced by the choice-of-law clause, the California
rule would govern unless it came into direct conflict with federal law. See id. at 479.47 Id. at 478.
48 See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976)
(establishing that arbitrators cannot award punitive damages as a matter of public
policy).
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1. The Propunitive Analysis
The propunitive courts held that a New York choice-of-law
clause does not, by itself, prohibit arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages. 9 Instead, they maintained that the choice-of-
law clause provides the substantive law governing the agreement. 0
In other words, the arbitrators should apply New York law to deter-
mine whether the broker or the firm committed acts that deserve a
punitive sanction, but not to determine the scope of power of the
arbitrators. The propunitive courts grounded this conclusion in
their analysis of the particular arbitration agreement.
First, the propunitive courts studied the contract between the
parties to determine if it "evidenced a transaction in interstate
commerce."51 If it did, the agreement was subject to the FAA.
5 2
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,5" the Supreme Court held that the
FAA applies to the states via the Commerce Clause.54 Because
"most securities cases do in fact involve an element of interstate
commerce," the FAA usually applies.55 The First Circuit summa-
rized a court's duty under the FAA, stating that "the specific
question we must answer" is whether the parties, when they "agreed
to 'settle' through arbitration 'all disputes'. . . and to authorize the
arbitrator to grant any just and equitable remedy or relief, agreed
to include 'within the terms of [their] agreement' the power to
award punitive damages." 6
49 See e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (1lth Cir.
1988) (holding that a New York choice-of-law clause does not speak to the authority
of the arbitrators to award punitive damages);J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 830 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The choice of law provision, therefore,
merely designates the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply ... it does not
deprive the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive damages." (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994); cf. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the argument that a choice-
of-law clause in an arbitration agreement automatically dictates that that state's
arbitration rules apply).
'o See e.g., Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387; Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
"' Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387.
52 See id.
53 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
See id. at 12.
5 Constantine N. Katsoris, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: The Tower of
Babel Revisited, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 586 (1991).
' Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1989) (fourth
alteration in original). In Bonar, the Eleventh Circuit also suggested that the intent
of the parties ultimately controls the authority of the arbitrators. See Bonar, 835 F.2d
at 1387 n.16 ("Of course, the [Federal] Arbitration Act would not override a clear
provision in a contract prohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.");see
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The first place the propunitive courts looked to discover the
parties' intent was the choice-of-law clause. It would seem that by
incorporating a New York choice-of-law clause, the parties desired
that the agreement be construed according to the laws of New York,
which, as mentioned, prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages as a matter of public policy.57 The propunitive courts
avoided this apparent result, however, reasoning that the Supreme
Court in Volt created a distinction between substantive and
procedural rules and that the choice-of-law clause only signaled the
parties' intent to submit to the state's substantive rules.58 One
court maintained, for example, that "a choice of law provision in a
contract governed by the [Federal] Arbitration Act merely desig-
nates the substantive law that the arbitrators must apply in deter-
mining whether the conduct of the parties warrants an award of
punitive damages,"59 but does not govern the types of remedies
that the arbitrators can grant." The distinction made by this court
suggests that the holding in Garrity was not substantive state law,
but rather simply state arbitration law or procedural law and,
therefore, not relevant to a determination of the scope of the
arbitrators' authority.6"
The propunitive courts' interpretation of Volt and Garrity forced
them to look at indicators other than the choice-of-law clause to
glean whether the customer agreement contemplated granting
arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. The propunitive
courts consistently found evidence that it did. This evidence came
from analyzing the arbitration clause used in the agreement and the
arbitration forum chosen by the parties as well as from applying the
broad principles of the FAA.
also J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 830 (Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that "[flederal policy supports vesting arbitrators with the authority to award
punitive damages if the parties' agreement contemplates such an award"), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994).
"' See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (vacating
arbitrators' award of punitive damages on the grounds that "[p]unitive damages is a
sanction reserved to the State").
' See C. Evan Stewart, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Fish or Cut Bait, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 21, 1991, at 5, 6 (discussing the two interpretations of the Supreme Court's
holding in Volt and criticizing the propunitive interpretation).
59 Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387.
6 See id.
61 But cf. Stewart, supra note 58, at 6 (criticizing this argument and stating, "the
New York Court of Appeals would be somewhat surprised to know that its
pronouncement of New York public policy is not considered ... substantive state
law").
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Most customer agreements contain a broad statement defining
the scope of arbitration. For example, one typical customer
agreement provided for "arbitration of 'any dispute or controversy
between [the parties] ... arising out of [the brokerage firm's] ...
business or this agreement. ' " 2 Concluding that the encompassing
language of this agreement "seem[s] to contemplate a wide range of
tort and contract claims," one court held that the agreement
"contemplated punitive damages." S
In addition to considering the language of the arbitration clause,
the propunitive courts considered the rules of the arbitration forum
chosen by the parties. Often, the investor is given a choice between
several arbitration forums such as the American Arbitration
Association, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or
the New York Stock Exchange. Each forum describes the authority
of arbitrators to award damages in slightly different, but equally
vague, language.
AAA Rule 43, which governs the scope of arbitral awards, states
that arbitrators may "grant any remedy or relief" that they deem
"just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the
parties."" In comparison, NASD Rules of Fair Practice sec-
tion 21(f)(4) declares that "[n]o agreement shall include any
condition which.., limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any
award."6" The applicable NYSE rule also states that "[n]o agree-
ment shall include any condition which limits the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award."66
Some propunitive courts interpreted the selection of an AAA
forum to mean that the parties contemplated punitive damages. It
62J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 828 (Ct. App. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994); see also Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys.,
882 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing an arbitration clause stating that "[a]ll
disputes arising in connection with the Agreement shall be settled by arbitration"
(alteration in original)); Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1386 (containing an arbitration clause
providing that "[a]ny controversy between [Dean Witter] and [the customer] ...
arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration" (second alteration in original)).
'6 Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830-31; see also Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10 (stating that
the language of the arbitration clause is "sufficiently broad to encompass the award
of punitive damages").
6 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9-10. The court refers to the rule as Rule 42, an earlier
designation for the same provision. See id. at 10 n.4.
'5 National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Rules of Fair Practice § 21(f)(4), in NASD
Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) [ 2171 (1994).
' New York Stock Exch., Inc., Arbitration Rules Rule 636(d), in N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) I 2636(d) (1995).
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is difficult to understand why these courts, but not others, interpret
the AAA rule to contemplate punitive damage awards. The courts
themselves have supplied very little explanation for the distinction.
In Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, for example, the court
simply quoted the phrase "any remedy or relief" from Rule 43 and
concluded that it, in combination with the parties' broadly worded
customer agreement, evidenced "an intention ... to allow the
chosen dispute resolvers to award the same varieties and forms of
damages . .. as a court would be empowered to award." 7 The
customer agreement stated, in relevant part, that "'[a]ll disputes'
arising from the contract 'shall be settled' through arbitration.""
Other courts that relied, in part, on the choice of the AAA forum
to conclude that the parties had contemplated punitive damages
were even more conclusory than the Raytheon court in their
reasoning. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards Corp.
v. Cunard Line, Ltd.69 simply announced that "the expansive view
that has been taken of the power of arbitrators to decide disputes,
coupled with the incorporation of AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rule 43 by the parties, provided the arbitration panel here with
authority to make the punitive damage award."7" No substantive
explanation, however, was provided for this judicial interpretation
of AAA Rule 43.
The final factor that the propunitive courts considered in
concluding that the typical customer agreement empowered
arbitrators to award punitive damages was the general policy of the
FAA71 favoring arbitration in ambiguous cases. The courts relied
on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.72 that "any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration."" The courts utilized Moses H. Cone as a "tie-
breaker" that consistently favors arbitration of all issues. Thus,
where the agreement did not make the parties' intent clear, the
courts invoked Moses H. Cone to enable them to uphold the punitive
damage award made by the arbitration panel.7 4 The courts did not
6 7 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9-10.
6 Id. at 9.
69 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
70 Id. at 1063.
71 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Id. at 24-25.
7' See, e.g.,J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 830 (Ct. App.
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use the principle of Moses H. Cone alone to support a ruling that
punitive damages were within the scope of the agreement, but
instead coupled that principle with evidence from the broad
language of the arbitration clause7 5 and the choice of the AAA as
the forum for arbitration to reach their result. 6
2. The Antipunitive Analysis of the Parties' Intent
Relies Exclusively on the Choice-of-Law Clause
As mentioned previously, the antipunitive courts did not enforce
punitive damage awards stemming from arbitration agreements with
a New York choice-of-law clause. 77 Although these courts recog-
nized the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, they refused to
"rewrite the agreement to enhance arbitrability or otherwise expand
the scope of the arbitrator's powers."78 To do so, they maintained,
would be inconsistent with the FAA.7 ' The antipunitive courts
stated simply that in these cases "the language of the parties'
Agreement is clear: 'This agreement shall ... be governed by the
laws of the State of New York.'"8" The choice-of-law clause was
deemed to apply to the entire agreement, in all circumstances,
1993) (citing Moses H. Cone and explaining that "[flederal policy supports vesting
arbitrators with the authority to award punitive damages if the parties' agreement
contemplates such an award"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994). The court later
held that even though the NASD rules of arbitration used in this dispute did not
address the issue of punitive damages directly, that did not mean that the arbitrators
were precluded from awarding punitive damages. SeeMendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832;
see also Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting
the principle that doubts concerning the arbitrability of an issue "should be resolved
in favor of arbitration" (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9)).
75 See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830-31.
76 See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th
Cir. 1991); Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9-12; Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d
1378, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1988).
" See e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 716-18
(7th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1991).
7"Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716.
'9 See id. at 716-17 (noting that enforcing the state rules of arbitration even though
they restrict the arbitrability of certain issues is consistent with the FAA if the parties
intended that result); Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122 (same).
80 Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122 (alteration in original); see also Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at
717 (finding that the "parties agreed to arbitrate all of their controversies under New
York law").
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including the arbitrators' authority to grant remedies.
8 1
The antipunitive courts concluded that by selecting New York
law to govern the agreement the parties manifested their intent to
be bound by Garrity.8 2 In other words, the parties agreed that
punitive damages would not be an available remedy. Therefore, any
arbitral punitive damage award was overturned pursuant to
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which provides that awards may be vacated
"[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
"83
The foregoing comparison of the approaches utilized by the
lower courts identifies the sections of a customer agreement that
define the parties' intent regarding the arbitrators' authority to
award damages and outlines strategies for interpreting those
sections. The Supreme Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.14 considered several aspects of the agreement just as
the lower courts did, but ultimately concluded that those consider-
ations were not dispositive as to the intent of the parties regarding
the scope of the arbitrators' authority to grant remedies.
8 5
However, due to the Court's approach, its conclusion resolved only
the single question of how to interpret properly a broker-customer
agreement drafted in exactly the same manner as the one between
the Mastrobuonos and Shearson.
II. WHY THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MASTROBUONO
FAILED TO SETTLE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE DEBATE
The Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono provided the
lower courts with very limited direction on the process of properly
interpreting arbitration agreements and, consequently, the securities
industry received little guidance on how to draft them effectively.
The court only resolved the dispute over the effect of a New York
choice-of-law clause on the ability of arbitrators to award punitive
damages, holding that such a clause, by itself, was insufficient to
deny arbitrators that power. However, the opinion suggested, but
did not clearly state, that a New York choice-of-law clause, in
combination with other language clearly describing its scope and
"1 See Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717-19 (rejecting arguments that the choice-of-law
clause only dictates the substantive law of the agreement and that the rules of the
arbitration forum govern the scope of the arbitrators' authority).
s See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716; Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
8 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
85 See id. at 1215-16.
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application, would be sufficient. Furthermore, the Court was silent
on the broader public policy issue whether arbitrators in securities
cases ought to be permitted to award punitive damages.
The Court began its analysis by stating that it viewed the
agreement as a standard contract between Shearson and the
Mastrobuonos. The Court cited its earlier holdings in Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees86 and Southland Corp. v.
Keating7 for the proposition that in a case such as this one, in
which the FAA applies,"8 the intent of the parties, not state law,
shall govern the authority of the arbitrators.89 Having established
the scope of its inquiry, the Court set out to determine "what the
contract ha[d] to say about the arbitrability of petitioners' [the
Mastrobuonos'] claim for punitive damages."" The Court looked
to two particular sentences in the customer agreement to glean the
parties' intent before ultimately concluding that the agreement did
not clearly speak to the authority of the arbitrators to award
punitive damages.
91
First, the Court examined the choice-of-law clause which stated
that "the entire agreement 'shall be governed by the laws of the
State of New York.' 9 2 According to the Court, this clause could
be interpreted either as a mere "substitute for the conflict-of-laws
analysis" or as a more sweeping application of New York law.
93
The Court stated that if the clause was intended to be a substitute
for a conflict-of-laws analysis, punitive damages would still be
permitted.9 4 Because the parties did not, according to the Court,
manifest an intent otherwise, "the FAA would pre-empt the Garrity
rule" and dictate that punitive damages be arbitrated. 5  On the
other hand, reasoned the Court, even if the choice-of-law clause was
intended to serve as more than a substitute for the conflict-of-laws
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
87 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
' The FAA applies to arbitration cases in which the parties have engaged in
interstate commerce. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
"9 See the discussion of Southland and Volt in Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215-16
(supporting the view that the parties may agree to submit to arbitration issues such
as punitive damages, even if "state law would otherwise exclude such claims from
arbitration").
0 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1216.
91 See id. at 1216-18.
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analysis, it was not clear from the contract exactly how far to extend
New York law."8 It is plausible that New York law was meant to
identify only the substantive law that governed the contract and not
the "allocation of power between [courts and arbitrators]."1
7 If
that was the case, the punitive damage award should stand. Basing
its decision upon the ambiguous purpose of the choice-of-law clause
and the fact that either of these meanings could reasonably have
been intended by the parties, the Court concluded that the choice-
of-law clause "is not, in itself, an unequivocal exclusion of punitive
damage claims."
98
Second, the Court examined the wording of the sentence in the
agreement that states, "'any controversy' . . . 'shall be settled by
arbitration' in accordance with the rules of the [NASD].""9 The
Court noted that the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure allows
arbitrators to award "damages and other relief."" 0 It does not
specify any limitations on the types of relief that can be granted.
Furthermore, the Court agreed with the analysis conducted by the
First Circuit in Raytheon which maintained that "a contract clause
which bound the parties to 'settle' 'all disputes' through arbitration
conducted according to rules which allow any form of just and
equitable' 'remedy of relief' [sic] was sufficiently broad to encom-
pass the award of punitive damages."101
After discussing the choice-of-law provision and the arbitration
clause separately, the Court examined them together. Together, the
two provisions did not illuminate the intent of the parties any more
than they did separately. Rather, they merely rendered ambiguous
"an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive
damage awards." 0 2  After reasoning that the parties did not
clearly express in the agreement their intentions regarding punitive
damages, the Court applied standard contract principles to reach
the conclusion that any ambiguities in the agreement should be




Id. (quoting the customer agreement between Shearson and the Mastrobuonos).
According to the terms of the agreement, the Mastrobuonos could have chosen to
arbitrate in accordance with the NASD or the NYSE.
" Id. at 1218 (quoting National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbitration
Procedure § 41(e), in NASD Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) [ 37 41(e) (1993)).
o' Id. at 1218 n.7 (citing Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6,
10 (1st Cir. 1989)).
102 Id. at 1218.
.0 See id. at 1219. According to the Restatement ofContracts, "[i]n choosing among
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punitive damage award was upheld.
The Mastrobuono decision did very little to resolve the problems
raised by the lower courts regarding the interpretation of arbitration
agreements. By restricting its decision to a critique of Shearson's
drafting, the Court's "opinion has applicability only to this specific
contract [or one just like it] and to no other."0 4 Brokerage firms
and courts now know that a broad arbitration clause together with
a New York choice-of-law clause do not operate to prevent an
arbitrator from awarding punitive damages, but other fundamental
issues remain unresolved.
First, it is unclear whether a brokerage firm could eliminate
punitive damages as a potential remedy by merely stating such an
intention more precisely than Shearson."°5 The fact that the
Court stressed the ambiguity of the agreement, but did not address
Shearson's intent to deny the Mastrobuonos the opportunity to
collect punitive damages in the arbitration proceeding, suggests that
manifesting an intention to deny punitive damages could be
permissible. However, in a footnote, the Court quoted NASD Rules
of Fair Practice section 21(f)(4), I°' which states that no agreement
may contain a condition that "limits the ability of the arbitrators to
make any award."" 7 The Court did not apply section 21(f)(4) to
Mastrobuono, however, because it only affects agreements executed
after September 7, 1989."' The effect of section 21(f)(4) on an
agreement that attempts to disallow punitive damage awards by
virtue of a New York choice-of-law clause, combined with clarifying
the reasonable meanings of a[n] ... agreement .... that meaning is generally
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979). The comment to that section explains that
the rule is most often invoked where the agreement is a standard form contract (such
as a customer agreement) and where the "drafting party has the stronger bargaining
position" (as Shearson did in this case). Id. § 206 cmt. a.
"' Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105 See id. at 1217. The Court explained that the choice-of-law clause would have
been deemed to speak to the authority of the arbitrators to award punitive damages
if the agreement had said, "'New York law' means 'New York decisional law, including
that State's allocation of power between courts and arbitrators, notwithstanding
otherwise-applicable federal law.'" Id.
o6See id. at 1218 n.6
107 National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Rules of Fair Practice § 21(f)(4), in NASD
Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 1 2171 (1994).
" SeeMastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6. The agreement between Shearson and
the Mastrobuonos was executed in October 1985. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting this date), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212
(1995).
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language, is unclear." 9
Second, the Mastrobuono opinion lacks discussion about the
usefulness of punitive damages as a tool to help the regulatory
agencies police the conduct of the brokerage firms.
Third, the Mastrobuono Court ignored the arguments made by
the Court of Appeals of New York in Garrity that arbitrators should
not be permitted to award punitive damages as a matter of public
policy.
110
Fourth, the Court did not address whether, by eliminating
punitive damages as an available remedy, a customer agreement
becomes unfair to the customer or, moreover, an illegal adhesion
contract.111
Fifth, it remains unclear after Mastrobuono whether the proce-
dures for awarding punitive damages in securities arbitration meet
the requirements of due process as recently outlined by the
Supreme Court.112
Because the Mastrobuono Court did not decisively determine the
future role of punitive damages in securities arbitration, that task is
left to the SROs in the securities industry.1 ' Determining the
proper course of action will require the SROs to examine whether
punitive damages in arbitration serve useful purposes in the
securities industry and what constitutional limitations exist on their
use. After studying the arguments, the SROs should conclude that
the beneficial effects of punitive damages on the regulation of
brokerage firms' conduct, and on investors' perception of the
fairness of securities arbitration, outweigh the policy arguments
against permitting them.
109 For further discussion of § 21(f)(4), see infra part III.A.1.
n For a discussion of Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976), see
infra part III.C.
"' See Richard A. Booth, Punitive Damages and Securities Arbitration in the Wake of
Mastrobuono, 9 INSIGHTs 20 (1995) (noting that the Court inMastrobuono left open the
question whether it is reasonable for brokerage firms to remove punitive damages as
an available remedy in arbitration).
112 For a discussion of the constitutional restraints on punitive damages in
securities arbitration, see infra part III.D.
"' For a discussion of SROs, see supra note 23.
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III. THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY REGULATORS SHOULD MANDATE
THAT PUNITIVE DAMAGES BE AWARDABLE
IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION
A. Punitive Damages Help Regulate the Brokerage Firms
1. Section 21(f)(4): Bark, But No Bite
The NASD, the SRO primarily responsible for regulating
securities firms, has already taken one step, albeit a tentative one,
toward preventing firms from excluding punitive damages as a
remedy in arbitration. In 1990, the NASD promulgated section
21(f)(4) of the Rules of Fair Practice which states that "[n]o
agreement shall include any condition which... limits the ability of
the arbitrators to make any award."" 4 The NASD maintains that
this rule operates to prohibit brokerage firms from directly stating
in the customer agreement that "arbitrators cannot award punitive
damages." t" 5 Moreover, firms may not attempt to indirectly limit
the awards available to customers: "Where the governing law clause
is used to limit an award, it violates Section 21(f) ... ."16 In
other words, section 21(f)(4) attempts to ensure that "if punitive
damages ... would be available under applicable law [in a judicial
forum], then the agreement cannot limit.., arbitrators' rights to
award them."
117
The rule does not, however, guarantee that punitive damages
will be an available remedy in all securities arbitration cases. For
example, customer agreements governed by the laws of a state such
as Massachusetts, where punitive damages are not generally available
in any forum, would neither offer investors punitive relief nor
contravene section 21(f)(4)." 8 As a result, the remedies available
.. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Rules of Fair Practice § 21(f)(4), in NASD
Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 1 2171 (1994).
n Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
6 Predispute Arbitration Clauses in CustomerAgreements, NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS
95-16 (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.), Mar. 1995, at 101, 102 [hereinafter NASD
95-16].
"" Id. (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 84,414 (May 10, 1989)).
"' See Telephone Interview with Deborah Masucci, Vice-President and Director
of Arbitration, National Association of Securities Dealers (Sept. 19, 1995) [hereinafter
Masucci Telephone Interview]; see also G. Richard Shell, The Power to Punish: Authority
of Arbitrators to Award Multiple Damages and Attorneys' Fees, 72 MASS. L. REv. 26, 28
(1987) (arguing that arbitrators ought to have the authority to award punitive
damages in Massachusetts).
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to investors may still vary depending on the choice-of-law clause
contained in the agreement. It should be noted, however, that a
brokerage firm must have some legitimate purpose for choosing,
say, Massachusetts law to govern its customer agreements (because,
for example, the firm is located there) and cannot simply do so in
order to take advantage of that jurisdiction's ban on punitive
damages." 9 Nevertheless, "a national securities market [cannot]
be well served by fragmenting relief based upon geographical
location [of the brokerage firm]."'
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Mastro-
buono, it is still possible for a firm to avoid punitive liability even
when New York law governs the agreement. For instance, in June
1995, the Supreme Court of New York, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Trimble,"2 ' declared that "an arbitration held in New York must
be subject to the State's prohibition on punitive damages." 122 This
case differs from typical broker-customer cases because no written
arbitration agreement existed between the parties. Instead, the
Trimbles, the investors, were able to file for arbitration pursuant to
the American Stock Exchange Constitution which mandates that its
members agree to arbitrate disputes with investors in New York
City. 123 The court reasoned that because the Trimbles elected to
arbitrate their dispute with Dean Witter in New York, they were
bound by the Garrity rule. Significantly, the court stated that if the
case "involved a standard-form contract [such as a typical customer
agreement] with the identical New York choice of law clause [as in
Mastrobuono], this court would not be bound to interpret it in the
same way as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Mastrobuono, since the
interpretation of contracts is a matter of state law."124 This
statement suggests that courts may continue to interpret the effect
of a New York choice-of-law clause differently, thereby increasing
the importance of the SROs' taking a decisive position on the role
of punitive damages in securities arbitration.
In sum, section 21(f)(4) alone does not function to prevent firms
from excluding punitive damage awards from customer agreements.
19 See Masucci Telephone Interview, supra note 118.
120 Katsoris, supra note 55, at 591.
121 1995 WL 535611, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 1995) (holding that the
arbitration panel hearing the parties' dispute may not award punitive damages).
'2 Id. at *3.
12- See id. at *1 (describing how the case came before the court).
124 Id. at *3 n.4 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1212, 1217 n.4 (1995)).
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Therefore, if the regulatory agencies want to assure that punitive
damages are an available remedy in arbitration, they must take more
proactive measures. In order to evaluate whether they should insist
on the availability of punitive damages in all securities arbitration
cases, the SROs should first consider the purposes of punitive
damages and assess whether those purposes will be served by
permitting arbitrators to award them.
2. Punitive Damages As a Punishment and Deterrent
Punitive damages are primarily designed to punish the wrong-
doer and to deter similar conduct in the future.2 ' Therefore, to
be effective a punitive damage award must be large enough to have
a significant financial impact on the wrongdoer and must be suffi-
ciently publicized so that others are aware of the offending conduct.
One commentator made the case for punitive damages as a
necessary deterrent in the securities industry arguing that "if the
securities industry is insulated from the dangers of punitive
damages... there will be far less deterrence and, consequently, a
greater number of abuses." 126  The Fifth Circuit stressed that,
without the possibility of substantial punitive liability, churning
investors' accounts would become "'low risk larceny'" for a
brokerage firm because it would only have to repay what it stole,
assuming it gets caught at all.
127
In order to punish a brokerage firm and deter it from engaging
in particular conduct in the future, the arbitrators' award must be
large enough to make the firm take notice. Because some firms are
wealthier than others, a set penalty will have disparate effects on
individual firms. Therefore, the arbitrator must have the power to
assess the net worth of the defendant firm in order to customize a
penalty so that it provides adequate "bite."1'2  Allowing arbitrators
1 See I LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNrIvE DAMAGES 24 (2d
ed. 1989); see also Shell, supra note 118, at 29 (noting that punitive damages function
to "(1) compensate plaintiffs for legal costs and fees, (2) compensate plaintiffs for
injured feelings ... , (3) deter and punish defendants ... , and (4) deter other
potential wrongdoers" (quoting David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer
Actions, 55 IOWA L. REv. 307, 309 (1969)).
" Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners by the Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association at 13-14, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (No. 94-18) [hereinafter PIABA Brief].
" Id. at 14 (quoting Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 332 (5th Cir.
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to accept evidence of a firm's net worth and then to determine an
appropriate penalty, guided by that information, is reasonable.
Many brokerage firms are publicly held, making the job of discover-
ing their net worth a simple matter of perusing their financial
statements. Privately held firms could be required to present their
tax returns or other financial data from which the arbitrators-or
someone easily consulted by them-could determine their worth. 121
Publicizing a punitive award is crucial to its function as a general
deterrent. There is a significant intangible cost to a firm when the
public is informed that the firm has been subjected to punitive
sanctions: namely, damage to its reputation. t 0 The importance
of maintaining a good reputation in a very competitive service
industry-such as the brokerage business-provides another incentive
for firms to avoid conduct that could result in punitive liability.
Furthermore, if other firms are aware that certain conduct by one
of their peers was severely punished, they will be motivated to avoid
similar conduct. Therefore, the fact that the punitive award was
assessed and, more importantly, the conduct prompting it should be
publicized. Currently, arbitration awards and the parties against
whom they are levied are made public,' and, in fact, a private
publisher reports the awards in a commercially available service.1
3 2
However, because full records of the arbitration proceedings are not
at 15 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating that most courts allow evidence of
defendant's wealth in order to determine an amount that will adequately punish the
defendant). But cf. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1991)
(approving Alabama's policy of not allowingjurors to consider a defendant's wealth
in making punitive damage awards but compelling the reviewing court to consider the
defendant's "financial position" when assessing the fairness of an award).
"' The arbitrators themselves may not be capable of determining a firm's net
worth by reading its tax return. However, it seems that a reasonably accurate
calculation could be made fairly simply. In cases where punitive damage penalties are
going to be awarded, the arbitrators could choose an accountant to assess the
defendant's net worth. Because the calculation need not be precise and is calculable
from accessible and manageable documents such as tax returns, this process may not
significantly increase the cost or time needed to dispose of the case. Estimates of the
effect of this procedure on cost and time are, however, important factors to consider
when judging its merit.
"' See Report of the Subcommittee on Punitive Damages of the NASD Legal Advisoy
Board, in NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 94-54 (National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.),July
1994, at 322, 329 [hereinafter NASD Report] (arguing that a firm's reputation, which
is essential to new business, is damaged by cases brought against the firm).
' See Shartel, supra note 23, at 31 (noting that since 1989 "arbitration awards
have become part of the public record"); Punitive Award Survey, supra note 36, at 1,
3 (same).
32 The Securities Arbitration Commentator, a newsletter focusing on issues relating
to securities arbitration, reports arbitration results regularly.
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publicly available, the conduct that prompted the award is not
always revealed."' More information about the offending conduct
would be available if arbitrators were required to write an opinion
or give reasons when awarding punitive damages; this would
enhance the deterrent effect of the award.""
Many channels exist to disseminate information about punitive
damage awards to the public and the rest of the industry. First,
many cases, especially those involving large firms, are reported in
popular newspapers.3 5 Second, smaller trade publications consis-
tently report arbitration results.13 Third, people learn about
arbitral punitive damage awards through judicial proceedings, when
courts vacate or confirm a challenged award."3 ' Fourth, because
the securities industry is a relatively small, closely intertwined
community geographically concentrated primarily in New York City,
information rapidly travels through the industry by word-of-
mouth.13 8 The existence of these mechanisms to spread informa-
tion about punitive damage awards increases their deterrent effect.
For example, the news of a large punitive damage award assessed to
a firm for failure to properly supervise its account executives would
likely be known quickly throughout the investment community.
Such a story would certainly catch the attention of firm managers
who would, in turn, likely check their own departments to make
sure they were not committing similar violations.
Although it is clear in theory that punitive damages can help
deter wrongdoing, the NASD maintains that sufficient deterrent
mechanisms in the industry already exist, making punitive damages
unnecessary for that purpose. 3 9 In a Notice to Members in July
"33 See National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbitration Procedure § 41(f), in
NASD Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 1 3741 (1993) (requiring that only the award be
made publicly available).
134 See infra part IV.B (recommending that arbitrators provide written reasons for
the punitive damage awards they assess).
"' See e.g., Prudential Securities Investor Is Awarded $800,000 in Arbitration, WALL
ST.J., Dec. 24, 1992, at A2; RaymondJames &Assoc.: Firm Told to Pay $378,000 for
Handling of Account, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1991, at A4; Michael Siconolfi, Appeals
Court Says Merrill Must Pay Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1990, at C13
[hereinafter Siconolfi, Appeals]; Michael Siconolfi, Arbitrators Rule Prudential Brokers
Churned Account, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1992, at Cl; Michael Siconolfi, NASD Panel
Imposes Punitive Damages Against Shearson for Actions of Broker, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
1992, at CI1.
"34 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
1 See Shell, supra note 118, at 34.
'
34 See id.; Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
See NASD Solicits Public Comment on Approaches Governing Award of Punitive
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1994, the NASD discussed three aspects of the current policing
system in the securities industry that operate to adequately deter
wrongdoing. First, the NASD employs committees that continually
oversee ordinary firm activity and investigate reports of firm
misconduct. 140 Second, the NASD and the SEC have the authority
to impose various sanctions on the firms and individual brokers
which are designed to punish and deter inappropriate conduct.141
The NASD in particular can impose fines, suspend brokers or firms
from conducting business, expel wrongdoers from the industry, and
force firms to pay restitution. 142 The Securities Industry Associa-
tion (SIA), an organization representing the interests of the
brokerage firms, argues that the NASD's authority to fine firms, as
well as suspend them from certain trading activities, is by itself an
effective deterrent. 14' According to the SIA, an additional penalty
in the form of punitive damages serves as an unfair and unnecessary
double punishment. 144 The third important aspect of the regula-
tory system, according to the NASD, is the "many avenues [that]
trigger the NASD disciplinary process."14 5  Because the enforce-
ment mechanism of the NASD is easily invoked, "[t]here simply is
no realistic danger that a claim of wrongdoing lodged against an
NASD member would escape the attention of [the] disciplinary
committees."
146
Although it is difficult to determine how to weigh the NASD and
SIA arguments about the need for punitive damages, the use of
private remedies to promote compliance with the law reflects a long
tradition in the law, including securities law.
147
Damages in Arbitration, NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 94-54 (National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc.),July 1994, at 319, 319 [hereinafter NASD 94-54]; NASD Report, supra
note 130, at 328-29.
140 See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 328 (describing the duties of the District
Business Conduct Committees and the Market Surveillance Committee in overseeing
the conduct of member firms).
141 See id. (listing fines, censure, suspension, bans, expulsion, and restitution as
possible sanctions available to the NASD, and listing actions for civil penalties, cease
and desist orders, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and seek orders as possible
sanctions available to the SEC).
142 See id.
14S See Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent by the Securities Industry
Association at 17-21, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212
(1995) (No. 94-18) [hereinafter SIA Brief].144 See id.
1 NASD Report, supra note 130, at 328.
146 SIA brief, supra note 143, at 18. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying tekt
for a fuller description of how the NASD disciplinary process is triggered.
147 See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (stating that "[p]rivate
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3. Punitive Damages Provide an Incentive
for Investors to Bring Claims
A second vital function of punitive damage awards is the
incentive to file for arbitration that they provide to investors with
small compensatory claims. 148 In theory, investors who otherwise
would not have filed complaints because of the expense of arbitra-
tion and the small size of their claims will bring those claims in
hopes of receiving a punitive damage award. 149 Encouraging all
investors whose money has been mishandled to file complaints is
important because the regulatory agencies in the securities industry
depend, in part, on customer complaints to help trigger investiga-
tions of the brokerage firms.
Punitive damages will provide an incentive for investors to file
claims if the ratio of punitive to compensatory awards is high and
if punitive awards are made with regularity. 5 ° The statistics do
not clearly indicate whether punitive damages provide this incentive
to investors with small claims. From May 1989 through June 1992,
punitive damages were awarded in just over two percent of the cases
arbitrated. 5 ' Furthermore, the ratio of the size of the punitive
enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to [SEC] action").
148 See 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 125, at 30-31 (stating that a person who
has suffered minimal damage and would normally not bring a claim may bring one
if punitive damages are available).149 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 128, at 12.
0 There is some disagreement among the courts as to whether compensatory
damages are a necessary prerequisite for punitive awards. The majority of courts
hold that punitive damages can only be awarded in cases in which actual damages
have been awarded. See id. at 14. Compare Suflas v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 218 F.
Supp. 289,290 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (noting that under Pennsylvania law punitive damages
cannot be awarded unless actual damages are also awarded) and Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. v. Reeves, 194 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Ark. 1946) (stating that the rule in
Arkansas "as well as the general rule" is that punitive damages may not be awarded
unless actual damages are assessed) with Scalise v. National Util. Serv., Inc., 120 F.2d
938, 941 (5th Cir. 1941) (stating that "in the federal courts, the giving of punitive
damages is not dependent upon.., the allowance of actual damages") and Wardman-
Justice Motors, Inc. v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512,516 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (holding that punitive
damages are "in no wise dependent upon... the actual pecuniary loss of the
plaintiff"). Keeton argues that if one purpose of punitive damages is to give people
with little measurable loss an incentive to file their complaints, there should be no
compensatory damage requirement. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 128, at 14. For
example, in a defamation case, the defamed may have only suffered embarrassment
and ridicule and thus be ineligible for compensatory damages; yet in order to
encourage such a person to bring suit, and deter the defamer and others, punitive
damages should be awarded.
1 See Punitive Award Survey, supra note 36, at 7 (reporting that between May 1989
and June 1992 punitive damages were awarded in only 147 out of 6870 cases).
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award to the compensatory award was 0.7:1 through the last half of
1991.152 Of the 172 punitive damages awards that were measured,
102 were for $50,000 or less. 5
Although these statistics suggest punitive damages do not
encourage investors to pursue small claims, other factors indicate
that they do. First, in the first half of 1992, the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages rose to 1.3:1.154 Second, the Supreme
Court has indicated that there is room for the ratio to increase to
4:1 before coming "close to the line" of impropriety.155 Even this
limit may be flexible, since the Court recently upheld a punitive
damage award 526 times greater than the compensatory dam-
ages. 15 6 At least one commentator believes that the decision in
that case sent a message that the Supreme Court will not attempt to
define a ratio or dollar limit on the permissible size of punitive
damage awards. 5 7 Third, punitive damages are often awarded in
cases with compensatory awards of $50,000 or less. 5 Thus,
although punitive awards for investors with small claims may not be
large in absolute terms, they do offer this group of complainants an
opportunity to increase the size of their awards. Fourth, although
difficult to measure, it is logical to believe that the prospect of
punitive damages causes brokerage firms to settle cases that they
would have otherwise arbitrated.'5 9 Settlement helps investors by
relieving them of the cost of arbitration and by guaranteeing them
an award. Furthermore, the settlement amount may be larger than
the firm would have otherwise paid had the fear of a punitive award
not entered their settlement calculation.
160
152 See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 322.
153 See Punitive Award Survey, supra note 36, at 5.
134 See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 322.
155 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (noting that a
punitive damage award four times as great as the compensatory award was "close to
the [permissible] line"); see also Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 332
(1981) (stating that a ratio of 3:1 is a proper "rule of thumb" in a churning case).
15' See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718-23
(1993) (upholding a $10 million punitive damage award that accompanied a $19,000
compensatory award).
" See Memorandum by Haythe & Curley (Aug. 1994) (on file with author)
(discussing the implications of recent court decisions on punitive damage awards in
litigation).
" See Punitive Award Survey, supra note 36, at 5 (providing a chart that demon-
strates that nearly half of the 172 punitive awards surveyed were made to investors
with compensatory awards of less than $50,000).
11 See PIABA Brief, supra note 126, at 13 (noting that the prospect of a punitive
damage award may prompt the wrongdoer to settle the dispute).
" See Masucci Interview, supra note 18 (speculating that the desire to avoid a
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The importance of punitive damages as an incentive to investors
to bring small claims extends beyond merely helping investors
receive monetary relief. In the process of filing for arbitration,
investors assist the regulatory agencies in their effort to effectively
police the brokerage firms. Despite the contention by the NASD
and the SIA that punitive damages are not necessary as a deterrent,
they could indirectly aid the regulatory agencies' policing efforts by
increasing the number of complaints filed, thereby sparking more
investigations. Gathering as many complaints of broker misconduct
as possible is particularly important in the securities industry where
one complaint could very easily help reveal a larger pattern of
misconduct by a particular broker or department within a firm. For
example, if a broker is caught churning one account he oversees, it
is likely that he is also churning other accounts. If his behavior is
due in part to insufficient supervision by the firm's management, it
is quite possible that other brokers in his department are churning
accounts too. In this scenario, a customer's complaint, regardless
of the size of the claim, can be very valuable. The investor's
complaint may trigger an NASD investigation that uncovers
widespread churning at the firm or by a particular broker.
16 1
"Clearly, the SEC [and the NASD] cannot scrutinize all securities
transactions and practices, nor can [they] prosecute every complaint.
When transgressors escape liability because investors do not sue,
broker fraud in the particular case is rewarded, and similarly
inclined brokers are left undeterred."
162
The securities arbitration system works particularly well to
ensure that if a request for arbitration is filed, the NASD knows
about it. Normally, an investor will file a complaint with the NASD
along with a request for arbitration."6 ' The complaint goes
punitive damage sanction may make brokerage firms more willing to settle disputes
on terms more favorable to investors).
"'1 Cf Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (11th Cir.
1988). In Bonar, the plaintiffs did not know that their broker had embezzled money
from their account until Dean Witter, the brokerage firm, told them several months
after they closed their account. Dean Witter discovered that one of its former
brokers had stolen money from several accounts after it received an inquiry from a
former customer of that broker concerning her account. This investor's inquiry
prompted Dean Witter to audit all the accounts managed by that broker. It was
during this audit that Dean Witter discovered that the broker had stolen money from
the Bonars. Although the other customer's complaint led the firm, not the NASD,
to conduct an investigation, it is apparent that every complaint, regardless of the
dollar amount it involves, can potentially uncover serious broker misconduct.
162 Wilson, supra note 4, at 153.
165 See Masucci Interview, supra note 18 (explaining how the arbitration procedure
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immediately to the regulatory division of the NASD." 6 In addi-
tion, notices of all awards granted pursuant to arbitration go to the
regulatory division. 165 Depending on the nature of the complaint
filed, or if the arbitrators award significant damages, punitive or
compensatory, the NASD will look into the matter itself. Thus, an
arbitral award of punitive damages signals the NASD that a
particular case is probably worthy of further investigation. The
investigation can then lead to additional sanctions.
16 6
B. Precluding Punitive Damages May Render Customer
Agreements Unfair and Possibly Illegal
1. "Stacking the Deck" Against Customers
An additional reason for allowing punitive damages is to make
securities arbitration equitable by providing investors access to the
same remedies in arbitration that would be available to them in
court. It is recognized that "the purpose of arbitration is to provide
a substitute for the expense and delay of court litigation.., without
compromising fairness."167
As mandatory arbitration clauses have become increasingly
popular in customer agreements, investors have begun to complain
that the terms of these agreements are unfair because they heavily
favor the brokerage firms.1 68 Investors accuse firms of "stacking
the deck" against them by dictating the significant terms of dispute
resolution. In particular, firms force disputes to be settled in
arbitration rather than in litigation, and they limit the investors'
choices as to the particular arbitration forum in which the com-
plaint can be heard. Specifically, many firms only permit arbitration
before SRO forums such as the NASD or NYSE, and not before
independent forums like the AAA. 169 Forcing investors to bring
their complaints to forums that are in the "brokerage firm's
proverbial backyard" invites skepticism about the opportunity for
customers to receive unbiased treatment.170 The perception that
operates to inform the NASD of possible firm misconduct).
16 See id.
165 See id.
16 Seesupra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (listing sanctions available to the
NASD and the SEC).
167 Katsoris, supra note 55, at 591.
See PIABA Brief, supra note 126, at 29.
' See GAO, supra note 23, at 4.
170 See PIABA Brief, supra note 126, at 25-26.
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the deck is stacked against investors will be further exacerbated if
firms are able effectively to eliminate punitive damages from
arbitration.
17 1
2. Contracts of Adhesion
It has also been suggested that, without the availability of
punitive damages, customer agreements might be regarded as illegal
adhesion contracts. 1 2 Brokerage firms currently have a decided
advantage in dictating the terms of their customer agreements. An
examination of the requirements of an adhesion contract suggests
that if punitive damages are eliminated as a potential remedy, these
agreements might become unenforceable contracts of adhesion.
An agreement can be deemed an adhesion contract if it is a
"[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers ... on [an]
essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording [the] consumer
[a] realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that
[the] consumer cannot obtain [the] desired product or services [else-
where]."' Such an agreement, even if based on true mutual
assent, may be unenforceable if it is unconscionable or against
public policy.'
7 4
In order to judge whether standard customer agreements meet
the test for an illegal adhesion contract, it is helpful first to isolate
the separate elements of the definition of "adhesion contract" and
evaluate the terms of the customer agreements in that context.
First, to be considered an adhesion contract, the customer agree-
ment must be offered on a "take it or leave it" basis-which is what
almost invariably happens in the brokerage business. For virtually
all customers, bargaining with respect to the terms of the customer
agreement is not possible.
17 5
Second, adhesion contracts can arise when market conditions
prevent customers from procuring similar products or services from
another source without having to sign an agreement that includes
' See Katsoris, supra note 55, at 593-94.
172 See PIABA Brief, supra note 126, at 21.
173 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
'7 4 SeeJOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs 418 (3d
ed. 1987); cf. Lechmere Tire and Sales Co. v. Burwick, 277 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Mass.
1972) (holding that a credit card agreement, although qualifying as an adhesion
contract, was not "so unconscionable as to require that it not be enforced").
" See John F. Cooney et al., Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1511, 1519 (1995) (observing that customers cannot negotiate the terms of
arbitration agreements with brokerage firms).
228 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 197
an arbitration clause. In short, the question is whether sufficient
competition exists in the brokerage industry to allow investor
choice. Currently, investors are able to choose firms that do not
require an arbitration agreement as a condition of doing busi-
ness.1 76 Moreover, some of those firms that do require arbitration
nonetheless incorporate choice-of-law clauses from states other than
New York.1 77 It is quite possible, however, that firms will inter-
pret the Supreme Court's opinion in Mastrobuono to uphold the
viability of banning punitive damages altogether through the use of
a New York choice-of-law clause and specific language defining its
application.17 1 If that is the case, and the regulatory agencies in
the securities industry do not intervene, all firms might choose New
York law to govern their agreements.
17 9
Furthermore, today's large firms, which handle seventy-five
percent of all investor accounts, require arbitration agreements with
New York choice-of-law clauses for margin and options
accounts.8 0 Adjusting the language in future agreements for these
types of accounts in order to meet the Supreme Court's require-
ments of specificity as hinted in Mastrobuono would be simple.
Although smaller firms also handle margin and options accounts, it
is probable that the range and quality of services offered at these
firms are not equivalent to those offered by the biggest firms. In
that sense, there is no real choice for investors who require the
services that only large firms can provide. The SEC, however,
speculates that market forces will change this situation if the issue
176 See GAO, supra note 23, at 29 (listing the requirements of small, medium, and
large brokerage firms with respect to mandatory agreements to arbitrate).
'7 See, e.g., Punitive Damages & Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Nov. 1994, at 10, 11 (1994) (providing excerpts of customer
agreements, one of which uses a Florida choice-of-law clause).
17' As noted in the discussion of Mastrobuono, see supra note 105, the Supreme
Court cited language that the agreement could have contained if the parties intended
New York decisional law to govern the authority of arbitrators to award remedies.179 The NASD's current interpretation of their Rules of Fair Practice § 21(f)(4)
suggests that a New York choice-of-law clause cannot be used to prevent arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages. See NASD 95-16, supra note 116, at 102. The
NASD's position on this matter, however, has been criticized by member firms,
suggesting that it could be modified in the future. See Masucci Telephone Interview,
supra note 118 (stating that some NASD member firms are unhappy with the NASD's
interpretation of § 21(f)(4)).
is' See GAO, supra note 23, at 29 (detailing the percentage of business handled by
firms according to their size). In a margin account, "the broker-dealer may extend
credit of up to 50 percent of the purchase price to the investor to purchase
securities." Id. at 16. In an options account, "the investor may purchase the right to
buy or sell securities before a specific date." Id.
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is important enough to investors.181 The argument runs that, as
firms compete for business, they may find that offering agreements
with arbitration provisions that permit punitive damages attracts
more clients. The likelihood that firms would expose themselves to
unpredictable and possibly very large punitive damage sanctions,
merely to attract business, however, seems tenuous. As a marketing
tool, potential punitive damage liability-and the increased legal fees
expended to fight claimants-is very expensive.
If the customer agreements offered by the brokerage firms are
nearly identical and not open for negotiation (that is, they are
adhesion contracts), they may be deemed illegal and unenforceable
adhesion contracts if they violate public policy or are unconsciona-
ble. Customer agreements that prevent investors from receiving
punitive damages do not seem contrary to the public policy
objectives expressed in the FAA. 8 2 The FAA policy regarding
arbitration is simply to enforce the parties' agreement according to
its terms without dictating what these terms ought to be.
183
A close study of the aspects of an agreement most likely to be
cited as unfair or unconscionable reveals that, barring a "no
punitive damages" provision, arbitration agreements as they are
currently drafted are not stacked in favor of the firms, and,
therefore, should not be deemed unconscionable. Should firms
construct the agreements to forbid punitive damages, however,
investors will have a much more persuasive argument that they are
unconscionable.
Critics of these mandatory arbitration agreements first claim
that the initial step toward unconscionability occurs when firms
force all disputes to be resolved in arbitration instead of litigation.
Although firms do enjoy the benefits arbitration offers over
litigation, investors profit as well. For example, investors with small
claims gain considerably from arbitration because they can bring
their complaints to arbitration without incurring the expense of
hiring a lawyer.'8 4 Furthermore, if punitive damages are available,
1
81 
See DANNY ERTEL & RALPH C. FERRARA, BEYOND ARBITRATION: DESIGNING
ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 39 (1991).
11 See Katsoris,supra note 55, at 595 (hypothesizing that an arbitration agreement
that prohibits punitive damages would probably not be contrary to public policy
according to the principles of the FAA).
'" See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (stating that the FAA's "passage 'was motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had
entered'" (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985))).
"s See supra part I.B (describing the benefits arbitration brings to investors and
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investors are able to collect the same remedial damages in arbitra-
tion as in litigation without expending the financial resources and
time that litigation demands.
Second, critics argue that firms which restrict arbitration to SRO
forums gain an unfair advantage.'8 5 Intuitively, this accusation has
merit. The SROs are funded by the brokerage firms.' 86 In turn,
it is the SROs, not the parties, who select the arbitrators.' 7 The
specter of pro-firm bias in an SRO forum, then, looms large.
Nonetheless, a study performed by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) comparing arbitration results in SRO forums with those in
AAA forums indicates that "the forum in which a case [is] arbitrated
[is] not a factor that affect[s] whether investors receive[] an award
or the proportion of any award the investor receive[s].""'8 In
addition to impartiality, the SRO forums hold another advantage for
investors: their filing fees are considerably cheaper than those of
AAA forums.1
8 9
At the heart of investors' fear that SRO forums are unfair is a
belief that the arbitrators themselves are biased in favor of the
industry. This belief is based on the unwarranted assumption that
all SRO arbitrators are loyal to the industry. In fact, on an SRO
panel of three arbitrators, only one may be an "industry arbitrator,"
meaning that she has some involvement or affiliation with the
securities industry."9  The other two must be public arbitrators
who have no connection to the industry.19'
Studies and anecdotal evidence also contradict the contention
brokerage firms).
"s Most firms do not include AAA forums among those which an investor can
choose. For example, in margin and options accounts, approximately 25% of the
large firms give investors the option to choose an AAA or SRO forum. Significantly
less than 50% of all accounts in all firms offer the AAA as an optional forum. See
GAO, supra note 23, at 32.
" See Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
187 See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 1128.
' GAO, supra note 23, at 35.
See id. at 46-47 (comparing filing costs in SRO and AAA arbitration forums).
As mentioned previously, no data exists on the cost of litigating a broker-investor
dispute because these disputes are either settled or disposed of in arbitration. See id.
190 See National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbitration Procedure § 19, in
NASD Sec. Dealers Manual (CCH) 1 3719 (1993). An "industry arbitrator" includes
anyone who worked in the securities industry or has been associated with a securities
dealer in the past three years. In addition, attorneys, accountants, and other
professionals who devote more than 20% of their time to securities industry clients
are considered industry arbitrators. See id.
191 See id.
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that industry arbitrators favor the brokerage firms. The GAO stated
that its "review found no evidence that arbitrators' decisions favored
investors or the industry."1 2 Indeed, one insider believes that
industry arbitrators are often tougher on the firms because they
have a personal interest in the reputation of the industry and want
to root out any corruption.
93
Not only are industry arbitrators unbiased, but their participa-
tion actually benefits the arbitration process because they are familiar
with the issues. Onejudge noted that, "an arbitrator steeped in the
practice of a given trade is often better equipped than a judge [or
non-affiliated arbitrator].., to decide what behavior so transgresses
the limits of acceptable commercial practice in that trade [that a
punitive damage award is appropriate] ... ."194 Therefore, it may
be particularly advantageous to the investor pressing a claim against
a broker to have an industry arbitrator on the panel. An arbitrator
with a superior knowledge of the issues will be able to resolve the
case more quickly, thereby reducing the overall cost of arbitration,
and will be better able to spot situations of egregious conduct,
potentially improving the investor's chances of obtaining a punitive
damage award.
19 5
Thus, the fact that firms require, as a precondition to doing
business, that investors agree to submit their disputes to arbitration
conducted in part by industry arbitrators in an SRO forum does not
support the argument that customer agreements are unconsciona-
ble. These provisions benefit both sides to some degree, and none
of them is unduly oppressive.
The third objection to mandatory arbitration agreements, and
the strongest argument for concluding that they are unconscionable,
is that they foreclose the opportunity to seek punitive damages.
Some investors argue that "construing the ... agreement to
arbitrate [in such a way that] result[s] in a waiver of the [investors']
ability to recover punitive damages for [] egregious misconduct...
renders the agreement unconscionable."" 6 Calamari and Perillo
state that unconscionability is suggested when one party deprives
192 GAO, supra note 23, at 58.
1 See Masucci Interview, supra note 18.
19 Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 365
(N.D. Ala. 1984) (upholding an arbitration panel's punitive damage award in a breach
of contract dispute), aftd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
195 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of having
knowledgeable arbitrators preside over the cases).
196 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 1, at 63.
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the other of his right to recover for the wrong done.19" 7 Whether
investors truly have a "right" to punitive damages is not clear. But
if the primary purpose of arbitration is to benefit both parties by
saving the cost and time of litigation, it does not seem fair for one
side, the brokerage firms, to also use arbitration as "a vehicle to
strip [investors] of their remedies." 198 Nevertheless, establishing
that a contract is unconscionable is difficult. Simply having a
superior bargaining position, and taking advantage of it, does not
render an agreement unconscionable. Even so, whether customer
agreements that forbid punitive damages are illegal adhesion
contracts or just highly unfair, industry regulators should mandate
that punitive damages be available to investors under certain
conditions.
C. The Argument Against Punitive Damage Awards As
a Matter of Public Policy Is Not Persuasive
in the Context of Securities Arbitration
The New York Court of Appeals in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.199
declared that under New York law arbitrators are not permitted to
award punitive damages as a matter of public policy.200  The
dispute in Garrity involved an author, Ms. Garrity, who sued her
publisher for failing to pay her agreed-upon royalties. 20 ' The
issue was settled in arbitration pursuant to the contract, and Ms.
Garrity was awarded $7500 in punitive damages in addition to
$45,000 in compensatory damages. 2  The Court of Appeals
vacated the punitive damage award, stating that "[a]n arbitrator has
no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the
parties." °8 The court set forth several reasons for its decision
which are discussed below. Close scrutiny of its rationale, however,
reveals that the Garrity court's holding should not be applied in the
securities arbitration context to prevent arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages.
The Garrity court first argued that punitive damages are a "social
197 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 174, at 424.
198 Katsoris, supra note 55, at 591.
a" 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
200 See id. at 795.
201 See id. at 794.
o See id.
20o Id. (citations omitted).
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exemplary 'remedy', not a private compensatory remedy"2 4 and
should therefore only be awarded in cases where the "wrong
complained of is morally culpable" and the punishment is designed
to deter future wrongdoing.20 1 Punitive damages in securities
cases typically meet this standard. As discussed previously, one of
the primary functions of punitive damages in securities arbitration
is to deter brokers from engaging in fraudulent, that is, morally
culpable, conduct such as unauthorized trading and account
churning.
206
Second, the Garrity court stressed that penalties or punitive
damages have traditionally not been enforced in breach of contract
actions such as the one between Ms. Garrity and her publisher.
20 7
This argument does not apply to typical investor-broker disputes
because they do not arise from a breach of contract. Rather, the
disputes tend to involve deceptive misconduct of some sort by the
broker.
20 8
Third, the court maintained that the "power to punish [is] a
monopoly of the State" and cannot be delegated to private par-
ties209 The court feared that the weaker party in a private agree-
ment would be subject to the "uncontrolled use of coercive
economic sanctions" by a private referee, such as an arbitrator, if
the party with superior bargaining position could insist that punitive
damages be an available remedy in their dispute resolution
agreement. 210 This paternalistic argument is only persuasive in
cases in which the party that is at risk of a punitive sanction is
unsophisticated and unable to protect itself. In the context of
securities arbitration, this protection is unnecessary because the
brokerage firms-the parties who would be subject to the punitive
m Id. at 795 (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1961)).
205 Id.
o See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing the types of conduct
that typically result in punitive damage awards in securities arbitration).20 See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 795.
' See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1379, 1379 (11th Cir.
1988) (vacating arbitration award that found brokerage account executive guilty of
stealing money from investor's account but recognizing arbitrators' power to award
punitive damages);J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 828 (Ct.
App. 1993) (describing brokerage account manager who was engaged in "deceptive
practices, account churning and unauthorized.., stock trades"), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2182 (1994); see also Siconolfi, Appeals, supra note 135, at C13 (reporting that a
Merrill Lynch broker churned the account of a deceased widow in order to generate
commissions).
209 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 797.
210 Id. at 796.
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sanctions in the overwhelming majority of cases2 1 -are indisput-
ably sophisticated and capable of protecting their interests.
Moreover, they dictate the terms of customer agreements.
212
Fourth, the court emphasized the importance of "judicial
supervision" of punitive damage awards. 21' The court worried
that without it, arbitrators' awards would amount to an "unlimited
draft upon judicial power."214  This concern is shared by the
United States Supreme Court.215  Therefore, the regulatory
agencies in the securities industry must address this issue as they
implement changes to the current arbitration procedures. Part IV
recommends, in part, that they address this issue by subjecting
punitive damage awards to full judicial review.
In sum, the Garrity court's reasons for not allowing arbitrators
to award punitive damages do not withstand scrutiny in the
securities arbitration context.
D. Constitutional Restraints on Arbitrators'
Authority to Award Punitive Damages
Determining that punitive damages should be available in
securities arbitration as a matter of public policy is only the first
step in ensuring that this remedy will be available to investors.
Before they vest arbitrators with the power to award punitive
damages, the regulatory agencies must address the issues raised in
a group of Supreme Court cases that hold that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires certain safeguards,
including judicial review, before a jury can award punitive damag-
es.2 16 Although the Court has not expressly applied this require-
ment to arbitral awards of punitive damages, it seems probable that
it will for the reasons discussed below.
2 17
"n See Punitive Award Survey, supra note 36, at 4 (illustrating that of the 174
punitive damage awards made between May 1989 and June 1992, 91% (154) were
assessed against brokerage firms, while only 2% (4) were levied against customers).
212 See Cooney et al., supra note 175, at 1519 (noting that brokerage firms do not
typically negotiate the terms of customer agreements).
213 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796 (quoting Matter of Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Union, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (App. Div. 1952)).
214 Id.
215 See infra part III.D (discussing constitutional constraints on arbitrators'
authority to award punitive damages).
216 See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2333 (1994) (declaring
an amendment to the Oregon Constitution unconstitutional because it essentially
eliminated the opportunity for judicial review of punitive damage awards).
217 Butsee Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186 (1lth Cir. 1995). In Davis,
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In order for the constitutional guarantees of due process to
apply to securities arbitration, the requirement of state action must
be met.218  Punitive damage awards in securities arbitration cases
involve state action for two reasons. First, the government compels
brokerage firms to be members of an SRO.2 19 If the government
forces membership in an organization, the organization's proce-
dures (in this case SRO arbitration procedures) may not violate the
Constitution, just as procedures undertaken directly by the
government cannot.2 0 In effect, private actors acting under state
the court refused to declare an arbitration panel's punitive damage award against
Prudential a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See id. at 1190-94. The court held that there was no state action involved in
the arbitration proceeding or in the lower court's enforcement of the arbitrators'
award. See id. at 1191-92. The court explained that arbitration was the product of
a voluntary contractual agreement between the parties and was conducted as a private
proceeding. See id. at 1191.
This case is not dispositive in determining the existence of state action in the
majority of securities arbitration cases, however, because the arbitration proceeding
in Davis was conducted in an AAA forum, not an SRO forum (such as the NASD,
NYSE, or AMEX). As stated below, see infra text accompanying note 219, brokerage
firms are required by the government to be members of an SRO; therefore, the
SROs' procedures, including their arbitration rules, should be subject to constitu-
tional constraints. Because the vast majority of securities arbitration cases are heard
in SRO forums, the debate about whether constitutional limitations apply in securities
arbitration continues. The NASD itself takes a conservative position on the matter:
it believes that arbitrations conducted in SRO forums are in fact subject to the
requirements of due process. See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 327. As a result,
the NASD may conclude, regardless of any court's position on the issue, that
providing brokerage firms with protections consistent with the requirements of due
process is a fair trade-off for mandating that punitive damages be available.
2,1 The state action doctrine makes the constitutional requirement of due process
applicable only to state actors or private parties who assume the role of the state by
performing governmental functions. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 457 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining the application of the
state action doctrine). A private party may be considered a state actor and therefore
held to constitutional standards if (1) there is a "sufficient nexus between the state
and the private actor which compelled the private actor to act as it did," (2) the
private actor is performing a "traditionally public function," or (3) there is a
"'symbiotic relationship' between the state and the private actor." See Citizens to End
Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 745 F.
Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1990). The Supreme Court recently employed this three-factor
analysis for determining the existence of state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) (holding that the use of peremptory
challenges in federal court by a private litigant qualified as state action).219 See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 327.
"9 See id.; see also Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1990) (holding that the
state bar association, in which membership is compelled by the state, must uphold its
members' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
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compulsion are considered state actors.221  Second, imposing
punitive damages is a "public function."2 2 In theory, "if private
persons engage in governmental functions ... their activities are
subject to the same Constitutional restrictions that are imposed on
the state itself."22 ' The constitutional restrictions on punitive
damage awards have been clarified by the Supreme Court in three
recent decisions.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,224 the Court held
that the Due Process Clause requires that courts employ procedural
safeguards to ensure that the size of "a punitive damage award is
reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and retribution."
225
In upholding the jury's punitive damage award, the Court reasoned
that the due process requirements were met because (1) the trial
court gave the jury instructions on factors it should consider in
making the award, (2) the trial judge stated his reasons for uphold-
ing the award in the record, and (3) the appellate court followed
specific guidelines to determine whether the award was reason-
able. 226
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,227 the Court
upheld a punitive damage award of ten million dollars-526 times
larger than the compensatory damage award.226 In explaining its
affirmance of the punitive amount, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of procedural safeguards. The fact that the "award was
reviewed and upheld by the trial judge" and that it was a "product
of... process" gave rise to "a strong presumption of validity."
229
The availability of a procedure for appealing an award of punitive
damages also weighed into the Court's decision.
230
' See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 327.
Id. Compare Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1976), in
which the court stated that "[p]unitive sanctions are reserved to the State" and that
"the use of coercion [ought to] be controlled by the state," thereby implying that the
act of meting out punishment in the form of punitive damages is a state function.
Therefore, if arbitrators punish with punitive damages, they are performing a state
function.
' NASD Report, supra note 130, at 327.
4 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
225 Id. at 21.
216 See id. at 23.
2 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
228 See id. at 2721, 2724.
29 Id. at 2720.
"' See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 326 ("In addition, all of the Justices
seemed to believe that a process that includes the availability of some sort of appeal
of a punitive damages award is constitutionally necessary.").
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In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg23 ' the Court reiterated the need
for meaningful judicial review of punitive damage awards. Honda
concerned an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prohib-
ited judicial review of a jury's punitive damage award "unless the
court [could] affirmatively say there [was] no evidence to support
the verdict." 23 2 This rule made judicial review of punitive damage
awards virtually impossible, a result the Supreme Court held to be
unacceptable. The Court noted that "U]udicial review of the size of
punitive damage awards has been a safeguard against excessive
verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded."
23 3
Oregon had effectively eliminated the safeguard of judicial review
and provided no substitute to protect defendants. Consequently,
the Supreme Court declared the amendment unconstitutional,
stating that "Oregon's denial of judicial review of the size of
punitive damage awards violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
23 4
The Supreme Court's decisions in Haslip, TXO, and Honda make
it clear that the Due Process Clause requires that punitive damage
awards be subject to certain procedural protections. The current
procedures in securities arbitration do not meet the requirements
set by the Court. As one judge from the Eighth Circuit stated:
In the arbitration setting we have almost none of the protections
that fundamental fairness and due process require for the
imposition of [punitive damages] .... Discovery is abbreviated if
available at all. The rules of evidence are employed, if at all, in a
very relaxed manner. The factfinders (here the panel) operate
with almost none of the controls and safeguards assumed in
Haslip.23 5
In addition, the scope of judicial review in securities arbitration is
very limited. As discussed above, 2 36 under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA,
arbitrators' awards can be vacated only where the "arbitrators [have]
exceeded their powers."2 37  Although the limited procedural
protections and the narrow scope of judicial review help preserve
the benefits of arbitration such as speed, simplicity, reduced
231 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
21
2 I d. at 2334.
233 Id. at 2335.
2m Id. at 2341.
' Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 889 (8th Cir.) (Beam, J., dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993).
2-' See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
' Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1994).
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expense and finality, the requirements of due process must also be
met.
238
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGING THE
CURRENT ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
The current procedures for issuing and appealing punitive
damage awards in securities arbitration are in need of reform. In
particular, the arbitration system must adjust to accommodate the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part
briefly evaluates some popular suggestions for reform and ultimately
recommends that arbitrators follow established guidelines when
making punitive awards and that the awards be separately review-
able by a court.
A. Popular Suggestions That Miss the Mark
Several recent proposals have recommended various adjustments
to the rules regarding punitive damage awards in securities
arbitration. None of these recommendations represents a true
improvement to the current system.
First, one proposal recommended that a "cap" be placed on the
permissible size of punitive damage awards.23 9 Although there are
several variations of the cap idea, each is premised on either a
chosen ratio of punitive to compensatory awards that cannot be
exceeded (1:1 or 2:1) or the imposition of a dollar figure maximum
on punitive damages ($250,000 to $500,000).2 The cap concept,
particularly in its "ratio limit" form, is flawed due to its rigidity. To
illustrate, in some cases the compensatory award may be very low
yet the conduct of the firm may be deserving of serious punishment.
For example, if a broker was making unauthorized trades in an
investor's account, but was caught before he had caused large losses,
the compensatory award would be very low. In this situation, a
large punitive award might be justified in order to deter future
misconduct by the broker and to compel the firm to watch over its
employees more closely. 4 Because of its inflexibility, a ratio cap
2. See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 1140 (suggesting that limitingjudicial review to
only the punitive damage portion of an award would not significantly reduce the time
and cost benefits of arbitration).
..9 See NASD Report, supra note 130, at 333-34 (advocating either a ratio limit or
an absolute dollar figure limit).
240 See id.
241 Compare TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993),
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would prevent this deterrence. A dollar figure cap could also be
insufficient as a deterrent and punishment if the compensatory
damages are very high. In addition to these problems, a cap is
unnecessary if the arbitrators follow guidelines for making the
awards and the awards themselves are subject to judicial review.
Second, one prominent commentator on securities arbitration
suggests that firms include an "opt out" clause in their arbitration
agreements. 242  The opt out clause would allow one party to
remove the entire case to a civil court if the other party seeks
punitive damages. The theory of this proposal is that parties
wanting swift arbitral justice would sue only for compensatory
damages. Thus, investors could compel arbitration by limiting their
claims, while brokerage firms could gain the increased procedural
safeguards of courtroom litigation in a case asking for punitive
damages, presumably because of the higher stakes involved and the
likelihood that it is a more complex case. Although appealing at
first glance, the opt out clause suffers from several defects. First,
such a system brings great benefits to the brokerage firms at the
expense of small claimants. A brokerage firm could effectively
discourage an investor with a small compensatory claim, who cannot
afford to litigate, from requesting punitive damages. As a result,
the incentive for investors to file claims, provided by the possibility
of a punitive damage award, would be lost. Second, instituting a
procedure that necessarily involves the court system robs the parties
of the advantages of speed and low cost that are central to arbitra-
tion. Finally, this procedure would further bog down a court system
already overwhelmed by cases.
Third, some have suggested bifurcated proceedings in which the
compensatory claim is decided by the arbitrators while the punitive
claim goes directly to a judge and jury.243 Bifurcated proceedings
of this type are not a sensible option. "The delay, extra cost and
possibility for inconsistent or incompatible outcomes that could
result from such separate procedures are hardly the panacea for a
in which ajury awarded a plaintiff $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million
in punitive damages. The Supreme Court upheld the award noting that the potential
gain for the defendant company, had its trickery worked, would have been close to
$10 million. See id. at 2722.242 See C. Evan Stewart, Arbitrating Securities Law Claims: Can the Failed Promise Be
Redeemed?, in SEcuRITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 163, 178 (Edward
J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994).
21 See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 1140 (noting this suggestion and rejecting it as
impractical).
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court system already clogged with too many other cases." 244 In
addition, bifurcation would prevent investors who cannot afford
litigation from pursuing punitive damages, thereby losing the
benefit of deterrence that these claims and awards bring. Knowing
that in most cases the extent of their liability will be only compensa-
tory damages, firms would have less incentive to be careful.
B. Guidelines, Written Decisions and Judicial Review
The recent Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part IILD
clearly state that punitive damage awards can only be made where
procedural safeguards are in place to guarantee that the size of the
award does not violate the party's due process rights. In these
cases, the Court declared that the opportunity for judicial review
was one such safeguard.2 45 Evidence that the factfinder was given
instructions on how to arrive at a proper award and that the trial
court judge stated his reasons for upholding the jury's award into
the record impressed the Court as providing protections which
satisfy the Due Process Clause.2 46 Consistent with these decisions,
a three-pronged reform of the procedure for making and contesting
punitive damage awards is recommended.
First, the regulatory agencies should establish guidelines which
arbitrators must follow when deciding whether to award punitive
damages and how large the* award should be. In Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip,247 the Court noted the significance of
instructions that guided the jury on the considerations that should
be weighed when determining whether to award punitive dam-
ages. 24 In arbitration, the panelists are guided only by their per-
sonal notions of justice when faced with the question whether to
award punitive damages and in what amount. Although arbitrators
are usually more experienced than jurors, and thus presumably
better prepared to decide whether punitive damages should be
awarded and in what amount, an established set of criteria would
improve the consistency and predictability of punitive awards,
thereby increasing fairness in the arbitration process. The regula-
tors should mandate that arbitrators consider a number of factors
when granting an award, such as the amount at stake in the
2 " Id.
245 See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Honda case).
246 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Haslip case).
247 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
248 See id. at 19-20.
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arbitration, the defendant firm's net worth, any bad faith exhibited
by the firm, and whether the firm is a repeat offender.
249
Second, the arbitrators should be compelled to provide written
reasons for any punitive damage awards they make. Meaningful
judicial review of arbitral awards under the current system is
practically impossible because arbitrators do not provide reasons for
their decisions.25 As noted by the Court in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg,"51 judicial review of a punitive damage award is an impor-
tant element of due process.252  Moreover, a punitive damage
award will more effectively deter similar misconduct by other
brokerage firms if they are aware of the specific wrongdoing
committed by the penalized firm. However, requiring arbitrators to
draft reasons for their awards imposes certain costs on the arbitra-
tion system.15  The costs include (1) discouraging some qualified
people from serving as arbitrators because they do not have time to
draft opinions, (2) risking that the arbitrators will draft poor quality
opinions, and (3) reducing the speed of the arbitration process.
Although these concerns are valid reasons for not forcing arbitra-
tors to draft opinions in each case, they are not persuasive if
arbitrators are only required to state their reasons for awarding
punitive damages for purposes of judicial review. Judicial review
can be performed without "a judge-like scholarly" arbitral opin-
ion.254 Furthermore, because punitive damages are awarded so
infrequently (in approximately two percent of the cases), a brief
explanation for the award in these cases should neither significantly
slow the process nor deter individuals from becoming arbitrators.
Third, any punitive damage award made by arbitrators should
be subject to review by a court. 255 Because, under the procedures
recommended here, the arbitrators' award would be premised on
guidelines established by the regulatory agencies and justified with
written reasons, judicial review should work effectively. The
opportunity for judicial review would satisfy the Court's concern in
249 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2722
(1993) (noting the importance of these criteria when evaluating the propriety of a
punitive damage award).
Io See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
251 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
2 See id. at 2335, 2341.
"' See Katsoris, supra note 20, at 1133-34 (noting these costs to the arbitration
system, but concluding that they are worthwhile).
2' See Stewart, supra note 31, at 360.
" See Katsoris, supra note 55, at 599-600 (supportingjudicial review of punitive
damage awards).
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Honda without severely undermining the goals of arbitration as a
fast, inexpensive, and final forum for dispute resolution. Under this
approach the arbitrator would hear the entire case and determine
all the appropriate damages, thereby maintaining the speed and cost
savings of the arbitral method of dispute resolution. The principle
of finality would also be largely preserved because the compensatory
damage award would not be subject to judicial review. In addition,
the cost of appealing the arbitrators' ruling to a court, and the
policy of courts to uphold arbitrators' awards in most cases, should
discourage firms from filing frivolous appeals.
By leaving the power to award punitive damages with the
arbitrators, the benefits punitive damages provide for the gover-
nance of the securities industry are also retained. The threat of a
monetary punishment will motivate firms to oversee their
employees' activities more closely. It will also encourage firms to
settle disputes that do arise with investors, instead of fighting each
claim, thereby increasing the speed and reducing the overall costs
of dispute resolution. Moreover, including punitive damages as a
potential remedy in arbitration supports the notion that, by
agreeing to arbitrate, investors are not submitting to a form of
dispute resolution in which the "deck is stacked" against them.
CONCLUSION
With Mastrobuono, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
dictate significant change in securities arbitration. The Court failed
to do so, however, and instead rendered a narrowly tailored, limited
opinion. The fate of punitive damages in securities arbitration
remains, then, in the hands of the regulatory agencies. In determin-
ing how to proceed, the regulatory agencies need to balance the
benefits punitive damages bring to investors and to the governance
of the industry as a whole against the due process rights of the
brokerage firms. By accepting the proposals in this Comment, and
subjecting punitive damage awards to judicial review after requiring
arbitrators to follow established guidelines and give written reasons
for the awards, the regulators will successfully address the demands
of investors, brokerage firms, and the Constitution.
